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COMMENTARY 
IS THIS REALLY 
NECESSARY? 
THE BOARD OF PSYCHOLOGY: 
WE'RE OKAY, YOU'RE NOT 
Political conservatives contend that 
much of government consists of self-
serving attempts by interested parties to 
use the power of the state for group ag-
grandizement. They will find aid and 
comfort for their weltanschauung in the 
operations of the state Board of Psychol-
ogy. Not that anyone need look far for 
demonstrations of cartels masquerading 
successfully as public officialdom-but 
this Board may be an illustrative arche-
type. The word "quintessential" captures 
the spirit. 
Only Bob Newharts Need Apply: 
The Problem of 
Testing Competence 
The first problem faced by a board 
attempting to regulate professional psy-
chologists through licensure is conced-
edly difficult: How does it determine 
who should be licensed? As with most 
agencies regulating a trade or profes-
sion, the Psychology Board is given the 
power to license in order to assure hon-
est and competent practitioners. But how 
does one assure a competent psycholo-
gist? Do you test for it? How? Do you 
require an apprenticeship? What are the 
criteria? What is a correct answer? Are 
you sure? 
The Psychology Board has taken the 
traditional approach-educational re-
quirements, supervised experience, a na-
tionally standardized written test used 
in all fifty states, and an oral examina-
tion. However, the examinations do not 
assure competence. They are more a mea-
sure of a student's familiarity with vo-
cabulary and general doctrine. To be fair, 
such a criticism can be made of many 
trades and professions licensed through 
examination. Even the licensure exami-
nations administered to physicians or at-
torneys have little to do with the actual 
skills relied upon by clients or patients. 
Rather, they are a kind of general intelli-
gence test measuring the ability of the 
student to retain material recently ab-
sorbed over the past several months or 
years. The Board of Psychology, as with 
most regulatory agencies, does not at-
tempt to measure competence-even 
minimally-in the areas of actual prac-
tice as practitioners specialize, nor does 
it require retesting over the forty- or fifty-
year span of a career. In other words, the 
purported rationale for the entry barrier 
in many cases is only loosely related to 
its actual function. In a very indirect 
sense, a person able to pass the test must 
have general skills of retention, reason-
ing, and writing which probably relate to 
indices of competence. However, it 1s 
gilding the lily to think that there is a 
bona fide effort to assure actual compe-
tence-something probably more effec-
tively accomplished not by one "you're 
in the club" general intelligence days-
long test barrier, but by a short two-hour 
examination every three years in the par-
ticular specialty and practice of the pro-
fessional as relied upon by the public. 
Be that as it may, the Psychology 
Board is no more cartel structured than 
are most similar agencies. However, its 
examination-given the nebulous and 
sometimes disputed nature of the ser-
vices provided-is particularly impre-
cise as an indicator of competence. More-
over, the Board's cartel cup runneth over 
as it confronts applications from licensed 
psychologists of other states moving to 
California. Here is an interesting test of 
the bona fides of a regulatory scheme. 
The Board of Psychology does not pass 
this examination. 
Circle the Wagons-
Here Come the Infidels 
Unlike attorney practice (which turns 
on knowledge of a state's common law 
and procedures), psychology is not state-
specific (aside from basic knowledge of 
California law or public policy pertain-
ing to psychology). Although some com-
mentators contend otherwise, there is no 
unique California "psyche" requiring 
separate training. Under these circum-
stances, how should a regulatory agency 
set up reciprocity with other states? Au-
tomatic reciprocity with all states could 
be suggested, but there is concededly a 
legitimate interest in each state assuring 
the protection of its citizens from dis-
honest and incompetent practice-per-
haps under standards higher than those 
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selected by other sovereign jurisdictions. 
Okay. But on the other extreme, why 
would an agency wish to bar a demon-
strably competent practitioner from an-
other jurisdiction? Where such a practi-
tioner applies, look what the agency has 
to work with. It has an applicant who has 
not only taken a likely similar examina-
tion, but one who has practiced for some 
time and may have a track record to 
examine. 
The legislature was aware of the ap-
propriateness of reciprocity when it en-
acted section 2946 of the Business and 
Professions Code, creating a second track 
(actually three additional tracks) for the 
licensure of out-of-state psychologists. 1 
The Board is commanded to consider 
Iicensure without examination based on 
the performance of an applicant already 
licensed in another jurisdiction. The law 
specifically permits the Board to waive 
the exam for psychologists "who have 
made a significant contribution to psy-
chology and have had at least 10 years 
of experience." This should be a ready 
avenue for licensure. Here you have an 
academic record, the examination passed, 
and the experience and professional 
record to review. Where such a practi-
tioner is able to approach the midrange 
of current practitioners now being 
licensed, one would think that approval 
should be forthcoming. After all, here 
you are not rolling dice while 
blindfolded. 
Certainly these out-of-state practitio-
ners could be required to take the entry 
examination. "They should take the exam 
like we did." "Why not take the exami-
nation? It should be no problem for them 
if they should be licensed." But such 
sentiments are disingenuous. As we have 
noted, the entry examination does not 
directly relate to competence in actual 
practice, particularly for practitioners 
who have specialized in particular areas 
of practice and are developed in their 
careers. How easily would an advanced 
neurosurgeon pass the standard national 
board exam? Would a renowned crimi-
nal defense attorney, patent expert, or 
immigration specialist automatically pass 
the multistate portion of the Bar exami-
nation, or the general essay qu_estions 
concerning areas of the law far removed 
from and irrelevant to their practices?2 
The point is that the out-of-state se-
nior practitioner should not be subject to 
the same examination imposed on entry; 
it does not test actual competence except 
in an indirect sense not relevant to ad-
vanced and usually specialized skills. 
When applied to advanced practitioners, 
it becomes a cynical device to keep the 
infidels out-not because they are in-
competent, but because they are 
1r 
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competitors. "A harsh judgment," you 
observe. "Prove it!" you rightfully de-
mand. Enter Dr. Frank McGuigan, Ex-
hibit A. 
McGuigan v. Board of Psychology: 
The Cartel Is Tested 
Let's see, how would we fashion a 
resume to test our thesis? Let's give him 
a bachelor's and master's degree from 
UCLA, a California institution of some 
competence. Let's give him a doctorate 
from the University of Southern Califor-
nia. Then let's give him a distinguished 
42-year career, including both extensive 
clinical practice and academia. Let's 
make him a teacher of psychology, one 
who has trained California students to 
practice psychology for the past nine 
years. A professor of psychology and 
director of a research institute. Let's li-
cense him in two states. Let's make him 
the author of some one hundred articles 
in the major journals of psychology schol-
arship. Have him write not one or five 
but more than twenty books in the field 
of psychology, including a text on ex-
perimental psychology which has been 
translated into six foreign editions and is 
among the most used in colleges through-
out the world today. Give him interna-
tional awards. Make him a diplomate in 
expert professional societies for which 
the psychologists who sit on the Psy-
chology Board are not qualified and only 
dream about.3 List him in 22 directories 
as a noted practitioner and scholar. 
Now you have our hypothetical test. 
Except we did not make him up as 
Stanford students have done for years in 
attempting to graduate dogs and fictional 
persons from their institution. Frank 
McGuigan is not a "Warren G. Wonka." 
Frank exists, and he asked the Board for 
reciprocity licensure under section 2946. 
What do you think happened? Per-
haps, you might muse, there was a three-
second discussion at a Board meeting 
during which the members expressed 
pleasure that such a prominent practitio-
ner would want to join their club and 
scoffed at the notion that such a person 
would not meet the minimal standards 
for practice in California. Perhaps you 
opine that such a decision would be, in 
the current vernacular, a "no-brainer." If 
so, you do not fully appreciate the cartel 
"circle the wagons" mentality of a group 
of peers in full regalia as "keepers of the 
faith" and "defenders of the flame." You 
do not understand the dynamic that con-
trols the Board of Psychology~onsist-
ing in majority of practicing psycholo-
gists who lack Frank's qualifications and 
largely engage in a competing theory of 
analysis and treatment. They said no to 
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Dr. McGuigan. No waiver, and no li-
cense without taking that exam. 
Dr. McGuigan could have studied a 
great deal of material irrelevant to his 
current practice, and taken the examina-
tion. But he was understandably insulted, 
and rightfully curious why section 2946 
of the Business and Professions Code 
exists and who, if not he, would qualify 
under it. He inquired of the Center for 
Public Interest Law about his remedies. 
We informed him that under the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act (APA), he had a 
right to a "statement of issues" detailing 
where and how his application failed to 
meet the relevant standards, and to a 
hearing if he believed the statement of 
issues was in error. We agreed to make 
sure Dr. McGuigan got a hearing, be-
cause we believed that this oversight 
would be redressed. No, we are not na-
ive, but we believed that-at least at the 
extremes~artel tribalism would give 
way at least to basic constitutional re-
quirement. We felt that in the course of a 
hearing, the Board would change its 
mind-with profuse and appropriate 
apology in hand. And, if the Board did 
not do so, we were certain that an admin-
istrative law judge would do so, and that 
a court would certainly look askance at 
any effort to violate legislative intent. 
We were wrong on all three counts. 
Let us briefly describe Frank 
McGuigan's six-year odyssey. He ini-
tially asked the Board for reciprocity 
Iicensure in 1984. The Board denied his 
request repeatedly over a four-year pe-
riod. with shifting "justifications" in each 
denial. We learned early on that the Board 
had adopted no rules, criteria, or stan-
dards to guide exam waiver approvals 
for out-of-state licensees. It wasn't inter-
ested in standards to which it might be 
held, but preferred ad hoc individual de-
cisions--one at a time-without refer-
ence to each other or to any consistent 
policy. Except there was one theme per-
meating these individual decisions: the 
Board said no. 
Upon our advice, Dr. McGuigan re-
quested the statement of issues and hear-
ing to which he is mandatorily entitled in 
1988; this prompted a denial, Frank's 
request for reconsideration, and another 
denial. We agreed to represent Frank in 
1990, and reiterated his demand for an 
AP A statement of issues and hearing. 
That request was denied in March 1990. 
We were forced to file suit to compel 
the Board to afford this individual his 
basic rights to procedural fairness. As 
we approached the court date for the 
hearing on his demand, the Board sud-
denly conceded. Okay, Dr. McGuigan 
would get his hearing, but only Dr. 
McGuigan. The Board reiterated its po-
sition that a hearing on a denial of an 
exam waiver is not required, and an-
nounced its intent to deny such hearing 
to anyone and everyone else. We discuss 
the problem of obtaining such elemen-
tary due process in our second commen-
tary below. 
The Office of Administrative 
Hearings in Supine Repose 
Eventually, the good doctor got his 
hearing, presided over by Chief Admin-
istrative Law Judge Karl Engeman. The 
result? The Board was sustained in its 
denial. The administrative law judge, to 
his credit, fairly stated the record and the 
qualifications of Dr. McGuigan; it was 
an impressive recitation and appeared to 
lead to an obvious conclusion to license. 
So how did the decision make a non 
sequitur leap from prolific praise to 
affirmation of the agency decision not to 
license? Factually, the only ephemera 
cited by the ALJ was the fact that al-
though Dr. McGuigan had impeccable 
qualifications as a scholar, theoretician, 
writer, and teacher, it was not entirely 
clear that he has the practical skills nec-
essary for effective clinical practice. 
Wait a minute. If one is qualified to 
write the book and to teach current prac-
titioners, how does it follow that he is 
unable to practice himself? To be sure, 
there are teachers of medicine who can-
not perform surgery because they lack 
the tactile skill to tie surgical knots within 
the proverbial matchbox. But with all 
due respect to Judge Engeman, the clini-
cal skills of a psychologist are not physi-
cal, but involve the ability to listen and 
communicate effectively. To know what 
to say and do and why and how. These 
are hardly different skills than those in-
volved in teaching, particularly when one 
is teaching others what to say and do and 
why and how. In this profession at least, 
the ability to teach others to do it is rather 
a strong indication that the teacher can 
do it. 
Further, Judge Engeman accepted an 
unlawful "underground rule" standard 
proffered by the witness for the Board at 
the hearing. The Board's witness testi-
fied that the Board interprets the phrase 
"significant contribution to psychology,'' 
as that term is used in Business and Pro-
fessions Code section 2946, to mean that 
"the applicant has contributed one or 
more works widely recognized and ac-
cepted by a broad range of psychologists 
and that books reflecting that work would 
ordinarily be found on the reference shelf 
of most practicing psychologists." The 
Board has never adopted this criterion 
under the Administrative Procedure Act, 
and the fairness of (mis)applying it to an 
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applicant who has no knowledge of it is 
dubious at best. In any event, the AU 
has no business accepting this so-called 
"standard" from the mouth of a Board 
witness; next time around, regarding an-
other applicant, in front of a different 
AU, a different "standard" may emerge. 
The real explanation for the Engeman 
decision may be found in his referral to 
the legal standard, i.e., he was unable to 
find that the Board "abused its discre-
tion." "While the Board could take what 
might be characterized as a more gener-
ous interpretation of this basis for exam 
waiver. the statute vests in them the sole 
discretion to grant any waivers of the 
examination," wrote Judge Engeman. 
The AU openly deferred to the judg-
ment of the agency-even under what he 
acknowledged to be in extremis facts. 4 
One purpose behind an independent 
Office of Administrative Hearings is just 
that: its independence. Scholars have long 
complained about jurisdictions which 
place their administrative law judges as 
employees of the very agencies whose 
prosecutions they adjudicate. It does little 
good to have independent review and 
factfinding followed by application of 
legal standards when they are applied in 
such a servile fashion. 
Conclusion: The Cartel 
Gets Shelter 
The Board of Psychology's judgment 
that "we're okay, you're not" covers any-
one not already in the club. It is interest-
ing that, as with the other medical pro-
fession regulators, entry barriers are as-
siduously applied-while, at the same 
time, practitioners who demonstrate in-
competence after they are licensed are 
seldom removed or sanctioned.5 Those 
who are in the circle are protected. Out-
siders are from a dangerous and alien 
"tribe." 
What has puzzled Dr. McGuigan an-
gers us. We understand the need to erect 
barriers to entry in extraordinary circum-
stances-to bar from practice a person 
whose incompetence can create irrepa-
rable harm. But does a psychology ex-
amination do that? Even if it afforded 
such an assurance, is it an indication 
entitled to greater weight than forty years 
of brilliant performance? Why have not 
all of the out-of-state applicants since 
1990 (six at last count) been welcomed 
with gratitude, rather than rejected? Most 
appear to have credentials easily war-
ranting licensure. Is this Board protect-
ing us? 
And we are more disappointed with 
the Office of Administrative Hearings. 
California has removed this office from 
agency control and given it independence · 
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so its administrative law judges may serve 
as a separate check on agency abuse of 
discretion. What is the message when 
the director of the entire Office delivers 
what amounts to an adjudicative blank 
check to the agency? 
FOOTNOTES 
I. Section 2946 requires the Board 
of Psychology to grant a license without 
examination "to any person who, at the 
time of application is licensed or certi-
fied by a psychology licensing authority 
in another state if the requirements for 
obtaining a certificate or license in that 
state were substantially equivalent to the 
requirements of this chapter." 
In addition, section 2946 authorizes 
the Board to "waive those parts of the 
examination, including either the whole 
of the written or the oral examinations, 
when in the judgment of the board the 
applicant has already demonstrated com-
petence in areas covered by those parts 
of the examination," and to waive the 
exam in its entirety to "diplomates of the 
American Board of Examiners in Profes-
sional Psychology or psychologists who 
have made a significant contribution to 
psychology and have had at least 10 years 
of experience." 
2. The most extreme example of the 
irrelevance of such an initial barrier is 
probably the real estate broker's exami-
nation. Here you have an interesting mul-
tiple-choice question pattern: Each year 
a percentage of the questions answered 
correctly is eliminated. We all know 
about the ambiguities often prevalent in 
multiple- choice questions-and one can 
imagine the natural selection monster 
several years of such elimination would 
create. But there is salvation, because the 
exam review courses pay examinees to 
memorize questions and the "schools" 
then give their students books with the 
questions and answers from prior ex-
ams-including many questions which 
will reappear. Pay us, memorize these-
a true test of competence. 
3. Dr. McGuigan is a Fellow of the 
American Psychological Association, the 
premier psychological association in the 
United States. Fellows are selected in 
recognition of outstanding and unusual 
contributions to the science and profes-
sion of psychology. While Dr. 
McGuigan is a Fellow of the Associa-
tion, the psychologist members of the 
Board of Psychology are mere members 
of the Association. 
4. The same spirit of deference also 
guided the ALJ's decision that a second 
basis for Dr. McGuigan 's Ii censure would 
not apply. Business and Professions Code 
section 2946 requires the Board to waive 
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the California examination where the 
applicant has taken an equivalent exami-
nation elsewhere. Here is one of the rea-
sons cited by the ALJ in upholding the 
Board's denial of licensure on this alter-
nate basis: "First, it may be reasonaqly 
inferred that the oral component of the 
Virginia exam did not cover laws pecu-
liar to the practice of psychology in Cali-
fornia in 1984." The question raised by 
this analysis is: When will any examina-
tion ever qualify as equivalent if it must 
include California-specific questions? 
The legislature's statutes supersede the 
Board and the ALJ is charged with inter-
preting them. Why would the legislature 
allow for examination reciprocity by spe-
cific command if it could never occur? 
Again, the criterion here used by the AU 
acquiesces abjectly to the agency. The 
judge applied a rule neither adopted nor 
lawfully adoptable, and precludes appli-
cation of California law while upholding 
a tabula rasa delegation of authority to 
the Board to deny reciprocity to any and 
to all applicants. 
5. See Fellmeth, Physician Discipline 
in California: A Code Blue Emergency, 
9:2 Cal. Reg. L. Rep. (Spring 1989) at I. 
Most of the criticisms directed at the 
Medical Board of California apply as 
well to the Board of Psychology, which 
operates as one of the allied health li-
censing programs under the Medical 
Board's general aegis (albeit with sub-
stantial independence). The pathetic data 
concerning physician disciplinary sanc-
tions generally hold true for most of the 
allied health professions, including li-
censed psychologists. As with physician 
discipline, the agency is essentially mori-
bund in removing incompetent practitio-
ners from practice. In the 1989-90 an-
nual report of the Department of Con-
sumer Affairs (the most recent statistics 
available), the Board of Psychology re-
ports that, out of 15,225 licensees and 
442 consumer complaints, it revoked four 
licenses and suspended three others. 
JUDICIAL CHECK OF 
AGENCY ABUSE: 
THE THIRD DISTRICT 
MOOTS ITSELF 
As our comment above recounts, Dr. 
Frank McGuigan was rejected for reci-
procity licensure as a psychologist in 
California notwithstanding an impressive 
record: degrees from UCLA and USC; 
42 years as practitioner, professor, 
scholar; and Fellow status in the Ameri-
can Psychological Association. As we 
argue above, one would think that a per-
son who has written one hundred major 
articles and twenty books, including a 
3 
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leading text used in the world on experi-
mental psychology, might be viewed as 
meeting minimum standards to prac-
tice. A big Steve Martin "but 
nooooooooooh" to that. And a no to all 
others so applying from out-of-state. 
We have noted our disappointment with 
the Office of Administrative Hearings 
in its obsequious deference to whatever 
the agency decides. Dr. McGuigan de-
cided not to test the agency's refusal to 
license him in court; such a contest 
would have consumed substantial re-
sources. But he did challenge the 
agency's failure to give him a hearing. 
In this regard, Frank sought to preserve 
his right to procedural due process-
our most basic check on bureaucratic 
abuse. 
On behalf of Dr. McGuigan, the Cen-
ter for Public Interest Law sued the 
Board of Psychology to compel it to 
give him an explanation and hearing on 
its refusal to license him without ex-
amination under Business and Profes-
sions Code section 2946. As noted 
above, if a person believes that he has 
been wrongly denied licensure to prac-
tice his trade or profession, he has a 
right to an explanation of his deficien-
cies (a "statement of issues"), and-if 
he believes that this explanation is erro-
neous or improper-to a hearing. 1 This 
assurance is constitutionally based, is 
included explicitly in the Administra-
tive Procedure Act fully applicable to 
the Board of Psychology,2 and is even 
restated in the adopted rules of the 
agency.3 Nevertheless, this agency said 
"no" to both, and reiterated that posi-
tion over a period of two years of travail 
as Frank and CPIL attempted to per-
suade it otherwise. 
The Conflicted Role of the 
Attorney General 
It is unclear to us at the outset how 
the Attorney General can represent a 
bureaucracy which seeks to violate the 
law. The Attorney General is in a con-
flicted position as counsel for the agency 
while also serving as the chief law en-
forcement officer of the state. We be-
lieve that the Rules of Professional Con-
duct compel withdrawal as counsel of 
any attorney being asked to facilitate a 
continuing violation of law; for the At-
torney General to remain as counsel 
under such circumstances appears to us 
to be a breach of the canons of ethics. 
We filed suit in Sacramento County 
Superior Court to obtain the statement 
of issues and hearing to which Dr. 
McGuigan was entitled. As noted above, 
when the hearing date approached, the 
Deputy Attorney General representing 
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the Board announced that Dr. McGuigan 
would be given an explanation and hear-
ing, but that no other applicant would 
be so treated. She then stood before the 
superior court and asked for dismissal, 
contending the matter was moot. The 
court so dismissed. 
Did you get all that? The Board de-
nied Frank's request for a waiver for 
four years. It then denied his request for 
a hearing for two more years. The minute 
he found an attorney willing and able to 
file suit on his behalf, the Board-pre-
sumably upon the advice of its attorney, 
the chief law enforcement officer of the 
state-immediately granted the hearing. 
That same attorney was then able to 
convince the court-with its overloaded 
docket-not to rule on the legal issue 
presented, thus enabling the Board to 
continue unabated its arbitrary, stan-
dard less decisionmaking and its whole-
sale disregard for the due process rights 
of applicants. 
A brilliant move-simply run every 
applicant around the barn, force them to 
exhaust resources on an attorney, and 
then give them their rightful due only if 
they pay the high entry fee. All others 
are denied. Constitutional rights-if you 
can afford to wait six years and spend 
your personal treasury. This from the 
Attorney General-the chief law en-
forcement officer of the state. 
But wait. There is a doctrine in 
law developed just to prevent such 
chicanery. 
The Protector of Agency Abuse-
Exceptions to the 
Mootness Doctrine 
Even if a defendant decides to pla-
cate a particular plaintiff, an exception 
to the "mootness" doctrine requires the 
court to decide the merits of a case 
where the challenged action is likely to 
recur or it is in the public interest to do 
so. Thus, we decided to take the issue of 
Dr. McGuigan's right to a hearing-an 
issue not formally decided when the 
Board decided to grant a hearing "in this 
one case"-to the Third District Court 
of Appeal. The appeal was an important 
one and in defense of a basic principle. 
Here, in an extreme case, an agency had 
denied basic rights guaranteed by a long 
line of constitutional cases, by statutory 
command, and by its own rules. It had 
publicly contended that it intended to 
commit such breaches again. At best, 
only those able to afford writ actions 
would be afforded their rights. Further 
(and as the Board well knew), without a 
ruling on the merits, Dr. McGuigan could 
never recover his attorneys' fees; he 
would never be made whole. 
For these reasons, a long line of 
cases-without compromise or equivo-
cation-have held that where such vio-
lations are likely to recur, the court 
should enter judgment instructing the 
agency on the proper law and allowin~ 
the plaintiff the right to be made whole. 
Such a policy is not merely just; it is a 
practical necessity if the courts are to 
fulfill their most important function-
acting as a check on the other two 
branches. Where the institution sought 
to be balanced has very little in the way 
of politically-based checks, such a role 
demand is especially enhanced. The 
Board is not amenable to electorate re-
sponse. It is special-funded and is not 
under general fund budget scrutiny. Yet 
it has important judicial, executive, and 
legislative powers-held in concert. 
In order for the courts to perform 
their important role in balancing and 
checking the agencies, they must re-
ceive cases. They are passive. They do 
not bring actions. To receive cases, they 
must be sensitive to the mechanisms 
which bring controversies into their do-
main. The mootness exception is one 
of the most important of those mecha-
nisms. If our judiciary allows agency 
defendants to pick off from court judg-
ment each plaintiff able to afford to run 
the legal gauntlet, the courts self-abdi-
cate. The courts are then saying, "We 
leave it to you defendants to decide 
what we hear and cede to you the power 
to reserve the application of our consti-
tutional guarantees and statutory pro-
tections to those able to reach us case 
by case, person by person. There will 
be no stare decisis effect, no collateral 
estoppel, no attorney fee equity 
redress." 
The Court Moots Itself 
into Impotence 
Would a court deny its own essential 
role and suffer its own abdication? Yes, 
it would and it did. It implied full recog-
nition that the agency was wrong, but 
opined that the issue was moot. While 
the issue will recur, it will do so in the 
context where the individual so abused 
can seek his or her own redress by court 
suit, as did Dr. McGuigan, and obtain 
the rights abridged. In a spate of pa-
thetic linguistic legerdemain, Presiding 
Justice Puglia managed to state the very 
reason for the exception, as ensconced 
in over a dozen published opinions, as 
the justification for not applying it.5 The 
Board of Psychology made a laughing-
stock of the Court of Appeal, and Jus-
tice Puglia-along with Justices Marler 
and Davis-joined in the laughter. 
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The opinion, which was mercifully 
designated as unpublished,6 is not 
nearly as interesting as is figuring out 
why it was written. To some extent, 
the oral argument in the case is worth 
discussing, because it reveals symptoms 
of a larger problem-larger certainly 
than the cartel pattern of the Board of 
Psychology. 
Our Amateur Psychoanalysis: 
Why the Courts Abdicate 
The Critical Legal Studies movement 
centered at Harvard contends that most 
judicial opinions are result-oriented. Fur-
ther, scholars of this school contend 
that personal ideology is one of the lead-
ing explanatory variables. I agree that 
most (not all) judicial opinions are re-
sult-oriented; however, I believe the 
CLS explanation misses the mark. 
It is not ideology or even class which 
determines the result. It is something 
much more interesting. Our society has 
divided into tribes as never before. In-
stead of the overarching national tribes 
or the intimate family tribes, we now 
find succor in occupational tribes. Ev-
ery trade and profession is politically 
represented as never before in our his-
tory. We identify with our professional 
peers, those who have endured similar 
boot camp entry experiences and share 
similar occupational problems. Weiden-
tify horizontally, not vertically. We as-
sociate more with other hospital admin-
istrators, attorneys, merchants, not with 
our patients, clients, and customers. 7 
Let's illustrate the problem from the 
oral argument in the McGuigan case. 
Justice Puglia, visibly irritated that the 
Psychology Board is being bothered, 
notes that the statement of issues and 
hearing requirement can be a problem 
for the agency. What if the Board de-
cides that the New York examination is 
flawed and cannot be relied upon for 
licensure? "Would the Board have to 
rehear the case again and again as other 
New York applicants object?" The last 
phrase was stated with incredulity. Of 
course, the Board may avail itself of 
collateral estoppel, or adopt a rule for 
examination reciprocity that New York 
does not meet and cite it as justification. 
Why would an applicant waste time and 
money relitigating a decided question 
before the very same forum which had 
just decided it in any event? And, of 
course, such a problem has never oc-
curred in any serious dimension. But the 
point is, who was the court identifying 
with? Where was the empathy? Whose 
shoes are being stepped in? It is fine to 
step in the agency's shoes, so long as the 
shoes of the citizen are also occupied. 
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The court might consider the alter-
native hypothetical to its own: Let's say 
the New York examination is exactly 
the same as the California examination 
and scored the same, except the order of 
questions is different. But California 
officials examine the first ten questions 
and erroneously assume it is a different 
exam. Under the scenario implicit in the 
court's approach, nobody would ever 
know that the tests are identical and the 
applicant should be granted licensure 
without examination. The applicant 
would simply be told no. No explana-
tion, no hearing. With a statement of 
issues, the applicant is told, "Your exam 
is different and here is how." And the 
applicant would have the chance to say, 
"Whoa, it is the same, look at this." And 
there would be a resolution at least based 
on notice and hearing. The truth would 
more likely emerge-as is always the 
case where the alternative is uninformed 
or unilateral edict. 
Why should we have to point out the 
advantages of notice and hearing? Why 
should we have to make such an argu-
ment to a sitting judge? Why should we 
have to convince him that notice and 
hearing are of benefit to all concerned, 
even an agency with an unconstitution-
ally restrictive or unlawful policy? Even 
it has an interest in seeing that its deci-
sions are applied based on an accurate 
understanding of the facts. That is what 
the court system is all about. That a 
court does not appreciate such basics is 
not a reflection of lack of experience; it 
is based on-and Dr. McGuigan could 
likely explain it better than we-psy-
chological identification with one of the 
parties. Regrettably, the party identi-
fied with is the one the court must check 
in the broader public interest, under-
mining that duty. 
The psychological empathy of a 
decision maker is not always determina-
tive, but there seems to be no more 
reliable predictor of outcome. The pow-
ers of rationalization do not decline with 
the enhanced intelligence of many of 
our jurists. Rather, they may even in-
crease by allowing a rich patina of fa-
cially reasonable justification to dress 
up a preordained result. Pick the right 
abstract value, attach the group to whom 
the jurist is sympathetic to it, and ob-
serve the result. The Board of Psychol-
ogy is itself a product of such a dy-
namic-consisting in majority as it does 
of practicing psychologists. But group 
identification between agencies and the 
courts is also strong. Both courts and 
agencies see themselves as government 
officials having to contend with calen-
dars and supplicants and the legislature. 
Both courts and agencies get tired of 
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people litigating or otherwise requiring 
their services who really should go away. 
Both courts and agencies understand 
the problem of the complainer who 
presses his or her claim. Both must be 
able to say no. Both respect the other's 
discretion in doing so. 
Conclusion 
In the McGuigan case, the trial court 
accepted the word of the agency that it 
would give a hearing to Frank McGuigan 
(after the agency had stalled for six 
years), and dismissed the matter as moot 
solely on its belated word. The adminis-
trative law judge then accepted the ex-
traordinary qualifications of the appli-
cant and the clear legislative intent to 
allow licensure of qualified out-of- state 
applicants, but deferred to the agency's 
preference nevertheless. The Court of 
Appeal allowed the agency to assess the 
applicant attorneys' fees as the price of 
obtaining rights assured constitutionally, 
by statute, and by the rules of the Board 
itself, and projected hostility to the ap-
plicant and deference to the agency, 
now perfectly free by court commenda-
tion to repeat the same abuse. 
The courts are becoming 
horizontalized and psychologically in-
tegrated with the agencies they must 
check. This decision 1s not an aberra-
tion, dear reader; there are many, and 
their number is on the rise. This is not 
what Madison and Jefferson had in mind 
in their brilliant formulation of a system 
of checks and balances. Would but they 
were here to help restore them. 
FOOTNOTES 
I. Section 11504 of the Government 
Code establishes the remedies of an ap-
plicant who has been denied a license or 
related privilege. "A hearing to deter-
mine whether a right, authority, license 
or privilege should be granted, issued 
or renewed shall be initiated by filing a 
statement of issues. The statement of 
issues shall be a written statement speci-
fying the statutes and rules with which 
the respondent must show compliance 
by producing proof at the hearing .... " 
2. The Board of Psychology is un-
deniably subject to the Administrative 
Procedure Act, under Government Code 
section 1150 I. 
3. Section 1381.2 of the Board's 
regulations in Chapter 13.1, Title 16 of 
the California Code of Regulations, pro-
vides: "An applicant for examination or 
licensure whose credentials indicate in-
eligibility shall be notified of the defi-
ciency. The applicant may correct the 
deficiency indicated or in the alterna-
5 
6 
tive file a request for hearing before the 
appropriate committee." 
4. Roev. Wade,4l0U.S.113(1973); 
American Civil liberties Union v. Board 
of Education, 55 Cal. 2d 167, 181-82 
(1961); Yellow Cab Cooperative, Inc. v. 
Workers Compensation Appeals Board, 
226 Cal. App. 3d 1288 (1991 ); In Re 
Lois M., 214 Cal. App. 3d I 036 (1990); 
Jasperson v. Jessica's Nail Clinic, 216 
Cal. App. 3d I 099 (1989); North Bay 
Regional Center v. Sherry S., 207 Cal. 
App. 3d (1989); Stroh v. Midway Res-
taurant Systems, Inc., 180 Cal. App. 3d 
I 040 ( 1986); Butler v. County of Los 
Angeles, 116 Cal. App. 3d 633 (1981 ); 
Barton v. Governing Board, 60 Cal. 
App. 3d 476 (1976); Kirstowsky v. Su-
perior Court, 143 Cal. App. 2d 745, 
749 (1956); Rattray v. Scudder, 67 Cal. 
App. 2d 123, 127 (1944). 
5. "In any subsequent proceeding, 
the board will either grant the relief 
sought, as here, or it will continue to 
deny the relief, in which case the matter 
will not become moot. Thus, no future 
litigant will be denied relief without a 
determination of whether the board is 
obligated to provide a statement of is-
sues and a hearing." McGuigan v. Cali-
fornia Board of Psychology, No. 
C0I0084 (3d Dist. Ct. App., Nov. 26, 
1991) (unpublished opinion). 
6. It has become chic for courts to 
depublish opinions, not out of fear that 
the appellate reporters are becoming too 
voluminous, but rather to ensure that 
review by the Supreme Court and re-
versal of a dubious opinion will not 
occur. 
7. As one stands in court before Pre-
siding Justice Puglia, one is in the midst 
of a rather dizzying collection of 
subtribes. Justice Pugha·s son serves as 
the public relations director at the Of-
fice of the Attorney General, counsel 
for the Board appearing before him. 
The father of the Attorney General 
serves on the Board of Psychology's 
parent agency. the Medical Board of 
California. The brother of the Attorney 
General is about to leave the Depart-
ment of Consumer Affairs, the umbrella 
agency over the Board. This is not to 
imply that this or any court made a 
decision because friends or relatives are 
in the neighborhood of the case. The 
problem is far more general and serious 
than that. The associations are cited to 
illustrate the interconnections which fa-
cilitate psychological identification-
empathy lines. The court--designed to 
check the agency--does not see itself 
as a check, but as a colleague. It is still 
easy for a court to check a blue-collar 
cop, but when confronted with another 
public official, one with a partial 
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adjudicatory role, with the same prob-
lems it has, what then? With whom 
does it identify? 
r 
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